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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-POWER OF COMMISSION TO REOPEN
AWARD AND GRANT FURTHER RELIEF-Moffat Coal Co. vs.
Podbelsk-No. 13651-Decided March 11, 1935-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. In case of error, mistake or change of conditions the Industrial Commission may at any time review any award and on such review
may make an award ending, diminishing, maintaining or increasing the
compensation previously awarded.
2. Where on reopening a case the Commission finds that the
award as originally made was insufficient in that claimant's condition
from the beginning justified a larger award the Industrial Commission
is authorized to increase the award for compensation.-Judgment
affirmed.

EXECUTION-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE TO DEFRAUD CREDITORS
-Ashworth vs. The Hugo National Bank-No. 13372-Decided
March 11, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
The bank brought suit against Ashworth on promissory notes and
recovered judgment. Before levy was made under execution he conveyed
the lands without consideration, to his wife.
1. Where a husband conveys all of his lands to his wife without
consideration after judgment is entered against him and before levy of
execution and the wife is aware of the fact that such conveyance is made
to avoid the payment of the judgment, such conveyance is in fraud of
creditors and will be set aside.-Judgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WHO ARE DEPENDENTS-MARRIAGE
SUBSEQUENT TO INJURY--STATUTES-McBride vs. The Industrial Commission, et al.-No. 13661-Decided March 11, 1935
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
An employee, having been injured in the course of his employment, applied for compensation through the Industrial Commission. He
was awarded a definite sum, payable in weekly installments. Subsequent to the date of his injury, the employee had married the claimant.
Upon the death of the employee the claimant filed this claim for the
unpaid portion of the sum theretofore awarded to her husband.
1. All portions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as originally enacted and later amended, should be read together and harmonized if possible. Sec. 57, Ch. 210, Session Laws of 1919, as
amended by Sec. 9, Ch. 201, Session Laws of 1923, which provides
that the identity of dependents shall be determined as of the date of the
accident, is modified by other provisions of the Act as shown by Sec. 52,
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Ch. 210, Session Laws of 1919, and Sec. 1, Ch. 174, Session Laws of

1931.
2.

Conditions constituting dependency may change during the

period between the injury and the death of the injured employee, and,

therefore, the extent of the right to death benefits cannot always be fixed
as of the date of the accident. Claimant, although having married the
employee after the date of the injury to him, is to be classed as*a depend-

ent, and, as such, is entitled to the unpaid portion of the lump sum

award.
3. The Commission having determined the full liability of the
insurer by the award of a lump sum to the injured employee, such award
became a vested right, which right would survive.
4. A strict interpretation is not to be placed upon seemingly con-

flicting provisions of the Workmen's Compensation statute.--udgment
reversed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
Mr. Justice Hilliard dissenting:
1. The only statute fixing the identity of dependents is amended
Sec. 57, above mentioned. Sec. 52, above mentioned, fixes merely the
degree of dependency, not the identity of dependents.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION---STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Frank

vs.

IndustrialCommission-No. 13573-DecidedMarch 18, 1935Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Frank claims under Workmen's Compensation Act, as an injured
employee of the Black Diamond Fuel Co. for compensation on account
of a ruptured appendix with a resulting peritonitis. The injury occurred
while claimant was lifting a mine car in the company's coal mine. He
consulted the company's physician who examined him, had him removed to a hospital and saw that an appropriate operation was performed.
The Industrial Commission denied this claim and the District
Court affirmed the decision. No notice of the claim was filed with the
Commission until nearly ten months after the injury.
1. The injury was a compensable one.
2. The six-month period prescribed for filing notice with the
Commission does not apply to any claimant to whom compensation has
been paid.
3. The furnishing of medical services rendered by or under the
direction of the company's physician constituted the payment of compensation within the meaning of the Act where such services are rendered by authority of the employer.-Judgment reversed with direc-

tions.
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MINES AND MINING-PLEADING-INTERPLEADER--SUFFICIENCY OF
COMPLAINT-Mosquito Gold Mines, Inc., vs. London-Butte Gold

Mines Co.-No. 13603-Decided April 29, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. Where suit was brought by London-Butte Gold Mines Co.
against the American Smelting and Refining Co. to recover the net proceeds of all shipments and the smelting company filed a motion for a
substitution of Mosquito Gold Mines, Inc., as defendant supported by
affidavit that Mosquito Gold Mines, Inc., claimed the proceeds of the
ore shipments, and the substitution was made, this procedure constituted
an effective interpleaded of the two claimants.
2. Where the amended complaint against the interpleader defendant sets forth the shipments and that the interpleaded defendant claims
some right, title or interest in the proceeds thereof, such amended complaint is good against a general demurrer.
3. Jury being waived, the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence were matters for the trial judge to determine.Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-FORM OF VERDICT-DAMAGES-POLL OF JURYNEW DISCOVERED EVIDENCE-Morgan vs. Gore-No. 13339Decided April 22, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Gore recovered judgment below for damages for death of wife in
one count and for injuries to himself and damage to his car in another
count against two defendants growing out of a collision between three
cars.
1. Where there was evidence that the two cars driven by two defendants were traveling between 55 and 60 miles an hour just before
crashing into plaintiff's car, defendants were not entitled to a directed
verdict. Whether the defendants were exercising due care as well as
whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury
to decide.
2. Where verdicts were returned against the two defendants
jointly for $2500 on each count but the jury added to each verdict that
one defendant should be assessed 75% and the other 25% thereof, such
added matter may be rejected as surplusage and the verdicts upheld, particularly where the court had clearly instructed the jury that if they
found both defendants guilty of negligence and damage resulted, that
each would be liable for all loss, injury and damage resulting from his
own negligence even though the negligence of the other defendant may
also have contributed.
3. A verdict is not vitiated where it finds the whole issue for
plaintiff and then attempts to find more for the finding of what is not
in issue is but surplusage.
4. The jury has no right to apportion the damages between joint
tort feasors.
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5. Whether there shall be a poll of the jury in a civil case rests in
the sound discretion of the court.
6. Newly discovered evidence held insufficient to warrant new

trial.--Judgmentaffirmed.
SALE OF MORTGAGED
AUTOMOBILES CHATTEL MORTGAGES PROPERTY WITH CONSENT OF MORTGAGEE-WAIVER OF LIEN

-Prather vs. Auto IndustrialCorporation-No.13407-Decided
April 22, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
1. A mortgagee of an automobile does not waive the lien of his
mortgage, duly filed or recorded, by consenting to the sale of the equity
in the car to a purchaser who assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage.
2. An attaching creditor could attach only the equity that judgment debtor had in the car.
3. That as between the holder of a purchase money mortgage
and an attaching creditor, who parted with no consideration, and did
not become a creditor by relying upon debtor's ownership, the equities
are in favor of the mortgagee.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
WATERS-CHANGING POINT OF DIVERSION-SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS Antonioli vs. Arlian - No. 13390 - Decided April 22,

1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Antonioli brought suit below whereby she sought to have decree
entered to change the point of diversion of certain decreed water rights
and was denied relief.
1. Where the relief sought was to obtain a decree changing point
of diversion but the evidence was that the change had been made 30
years prior and water ever since had been diverted from this changed
point but the court below and both parties proceeded on the theory that
it was an action to change point of diversion thereafter to be made, this
inconsistency in the pleadings and the evidence where the evidence
showed from the records that the change had been decreed theretofore,
will not be considered.
2. Where the court found from conflicting evidence that the
plaintiff failed to establish that the change in point of diversion can be
made without injuriously affecting the vested rights of others and denied
relief, such judgment will not be disturbed.--Judgmentaffirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PRIVATE CORPORATIONS REFUSING TO

FURNISH LIGHT AND ELECTRIC POWER-POWER OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION-Highland Utilities Company vs. Public

Utilities Commission-No. 13555-Decided April 22, 1935Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Since the passage of the public utilities act, the power to ascertain and determine whether or not a public utility should or should not
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continue service to the public is possessed solely by the Public Utilities
Commission, subject to a review by the courts of the action of the Commission.
2. Such Commission has exclusive regulatory power over all service rendered to the public by the utilities throughout the state including
municipalities.
3. When a public utility assumes to act as such, it thereby in
legal effect agrees to have its business regulated by public authority.
4. The court below properly denied a petition for writ of certiorari against the Commission seeking to set aside its order to compel
petitioner to furnish light and electric power to a municipality where it
appears that in a prior suit in the District Court, an order of the Commission ordering the furnishing thereof was sustained and such judgment of the District Court has never been set aside and is still in force.
-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-METHOD OF DETERMINING AVERAGE
WEEKLY WAGES WHEN EMPLOYED PART TIME-Danielson vs.
Industrial Commission-No. 13654-Decided April 22, 1935Opinion bq Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
1. Ness, a painting contractor, worked for Danielson for wages
a few days in each week during three calendar weeks in the twelve
months preceding injury received growing out of and during the course
of such employment. He died as a result thereof. During all the rest of
the twelve months, he carried on his business as a painting, contractor.
The Commission added the number of days Ness worked for wages during the three weeks, making a total of ten days and held that he worked
two weeks and that the average weekly wages was one-half of the total
earned which was sustained by the District Court.
2. The contention that because the wages were earned during
portions of three weeks, that the total earned should be divided by three
in order to ascertain average weekly wage is not sound.
3. Sec. 4421 C. L. as amended is construed to mean that where
the claimant was in business for himself for forty-nine weeks plus five
days in all fifty weeks, that the total wages earned during the remainder
should be divided by two and not three in order to determine average
weekly wage.
4. While for most purposes a week means a calendar week, this
is not true in all cases, particularly the instant case.-Judgment affirmed.
TAXATION-EXEMPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTY-NECESSITY OF
ACTUAL USE FOR SUCH PURPOSES-McGlone vs. First Baptist
Church-No. 13523-Decided April 15, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
1. Vacant lots held by a religious corporation and not in any
manner in actual use for religious worship or strictly charitable. purposes
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are not exempt from taxation under Sec. 5, Article 10, of the Constitution of the State of Colorado.
2. An intention to later use the vacant lots for the erection of a
church is not sufficient to exempt them.
3. It is the actual use and not the intention that creates the reason
for the exemption.--Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young dissent.
Campbell not participating.

Mr. Justice

FORGERY-PLEA OF FORMER ACQUITTAL-SUFFICIENCY--Sharer vs.
The People-No. 13397-Decided April 15, 1935-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouch.
Sharer was convicted of a charge of forgery and sentenced to the
penitentiary.
1. Where it appears that defendant was convicted by a jury for
forging an endorsement on a $700 check and in another case he was
acquitted by a jury for forgery of a similar check growing out of the
same transaction and both checks were a part of the same transaction,
the plea of "former acquittal" was a good plea and defendant should
have been discharged.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
INSURANCE - FIDELITY-CANCELLATION- EFFECT-LIMITATIONS
-Thomas Hickerson Motor Co. vs. Central West Casualty Co.No. 13439-Decided April 15, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief
Justice Butler.
The Thomas Hickerson Motor Co. sued the insurance company
and another to recover on a fidelity bond. The Court directed a verdict
for the insurance company.
1. Where a fidelity bond was issued and thereafter an instrument
was executed by the insured releasing the insurance company from liability for any and all acts of the employees committed on and after
August 11, 193 1, such instrument terminated the bond.
2. Where the insured did not file its claim for loss until after the
expiration of six months thereafter, it lost its right to enforce the claim,
where the bond required claim to be filed within six months after cancellation.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
INSURANCE-LIFE-ASSIGNMENT TO CREDITOR-ORAL TRUSTBosma vs. Evans-No. 13690-Decided April 15, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where a life insurance policy payable to a wife has a creditor
substituted as the beneficiary, the creditor to pay for reinstating the
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lapsed policy and keep up the premiums and at the time the insured was
ill and creditor doubted he would recover and such creditor was not a
relation having any insurable interest in life of the insured, the creditor
was a mere speculator and the policy in his hands was a wager and was
invalid.
2. Where in such case there was an oral agreement claimed by the
wife that such assignment of the policy was only for security for debts
and payments of premiums and the balance should be paid to her, and
the defendant admitted in his written sworn answer that there was an
oral trust for at least the premiums he paid, such admission takes the
case out of the rule that an oral creation of an express trust must be by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. An insurance policy may be assigned to a creditor as security
but in case of great disparity between the debt and face of policy the
transaction is a speculation and the beneficiary is entitled to balance after

debt is paid.--Judgment affirmed.
TAX DEED-PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY-BURDEN OF PROOF ON
ATTACKING PARTY - Richardson et al. vs. Halbekann - No.

13403-DecidedApril 15, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Halbekann obtained a decree below quieting title to certain lots in
Denver relying on a tax deed received in evidence.
1. At common law a tax deed was not admissible in evidence
unless accompanied by proof that all the requirements of law had been
complied with by the officer issuing same.
2. This rule has been abrogated by statute in Colorado.
3. In this state a tax deed is made prima facie evidence of its
regularity.
4. The burden of proving irregularity in the proceedings leading
up to the tax deed is upon the party attacking same.--Judgment af-

firmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler specially concurs. Mr. Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Young dissent.
WATERS-RIGHT OF DIRECT IRRIGATION AS AGAINST STORAGE-

People etc. vs.
Hinderlider et al.-No. 13235-Decided April 15, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
MANDAMUS-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-The

Plaintiff has decree for storage water for irrigation. It takes its
water from Surface Creek but except in flood times the creek does not
furnish sufficient water for direct irrigation for land under ditches taking therefrom. Some direct ditch rights are prior and some subsequent
to plaintiff's storage right. The State Irrigation officials refused to permit storage when water was needed for direct irrigation and plaintiff
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sought mandamus to compel storage as against subsequent priorities for
direct irrigation. Demurrer to complaint sustained.
1. Sec. 1682, C. L. 1921, expressly limits right to store waters
when not needed for immediate use for domestic or irrigation purposes and the time so needed clearly relates to the time when stored.
2. A senior reservoir decree may not be supplied with water when
the water is needed by junior ditches for direct irrigation.
3. The above statute is constitutional.-Judgmentaffirmed.
INJUNCTION-TAXPAYERS-RIGHT TO ENJOIN EXPENDITURES BY
TRUSTEES OF THE STATE NORMAL SCHOOL-Hoyt et al. vs.

Trustees of State Normal School-No. 13655-Decided April 8,
1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs in the trial Court and in the
capacity of taxpayers brought this action against the trustees of the
State Normal School to enjoin the carrying into effect of a loan agreement with the U. S. Government for the purpose of erecting dormitories for students on the school campus.
The Court below dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiffs were without capacity to maintain the action.
1. Section 1, Article 8 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, provides that:
"Educational

*

*

*

institutions

*

*

*

shall be established

and supported by the State in such manner as may be prescribed by
law."
2. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate the Legislature, by
statute, prescribed the control and regulation of such institutions, and
authorized the establishment of a State Normal School and created the
board of trustees, and make it mandatory upon such trustees to provide
suitable buildings for the use of the school.
3.
This power embraces discretion for its application in the
board of trustees.
4. This discretion was exercised by the trustees in their examination of the need for dormitories sought to be constructed.
5.
The power to govern carries the power to construct and
whether it shall construct is a matter solely for the determination of
the Board.
6.
Where the trustees contract to borrow money from the
United States Government for the construction of such dormitories,
with a further provision that bonds issued therefor and interest thereon shall be paid only from the revenues to be derived from the operation of such dormitories, and not by taxation, and that such obligation
shall never become a charge against the State of Colorado, the plaintiffs
below, as taxpayers, are not in position to enjoin such contract.-Judgment affirmed.
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CIVIL SERVICE-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO INVEST GOVERNOR
WITH AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND FUNCTIONS OF ANY DEPARTMENT OF STATE GOVERNMENT--Getty et al. vs. Gaff y-No.

13698-DecidedApril 8, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
A suit to enjoin the members of the State Civil Service Commission from interfering with plaintiff, Gaffy, in the exercise of the duties
of Secretary of the Commission, threatened by an executive order by
the Governor.
Plaintiff was given a permanent writ of injunction below.
1. Plaintiff claims under Section 13, Article 12 of the Constitution, and Section 127 Compiled Laws of 1921, authorizes the Civil
Service Commission to appoint a secretary, and under the constitutional
provision that persons in the classified service shall hold during efficiency
and removal to only be had on written charges.
2. On the other hand, the suspension of the Secretary of the
Commission was made by the Governor under Chapter 177, Session
Laws of 1933 which, among other things, provides that where there
is not sufficient revenue available the Governor may suspend or discontinue the services of any department, commission, board or bureau
of the State government.
3. The position of Secretary of the Civil Service Commission is
legislative and not constitutional creation,
4. Since the Legislature may abolish positions of its creation and
may provide for temporary cessation of the activities thereof and may
invest such power in the Governor by legislative enactment such as
Chapter 177, Session Laws of 1933.
5. The act of 1933 was within the constitutional powers of the
Legislature and the order of the Governor acting thereunder in suspending the Secretary was lawful.-Judgment reversed.
FRAUD-VACATION OF JUDGMENT--SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION TO

VACATE--STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Hunter vs. WilliamsNo. 13454-Decided April 8, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
1. Petition to vacate a judgment entered in 1926 which petition
was filed in 1933, where the allegations were fraud in obtaining the
judgment against a mental incompetent, held not too late.
2. The statute of limitations does not run against a mental incompetent where his guardian was unaware of the entry of such judgment until 1932 and then filed petition to vacate same.
3. The petition to vacate judgment alleged sufficient fraud in
its procurement that it was error to sustain a motion to strike the
petition.
4. If the Court was misled into entering a false judgment, once
false it is always false and persons under a disability will be protected
by the courts not only to redress a wrong to the helpless and injured
but to preserve the sancity of all that a judgment should be.--Judg-

ment reversed.
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WATERS-ABANDONMENT -

NON-USER -

EVIDENCE -

The Com-

monwealth Irrigation Co. vs. The Rio Grande Canal Water User
Association et a.-No 13093-Decided April 8, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
1. Abandonment of a water appropriation consists in non-use
coupled with an intention of the owner not to repossess himself of the
use of the water.
2. The question of abandonment is one of intention. Non-use
alone is not sufficient.
3. But where by clear and convincing evidence it is shown that
for an unreasonable length of time available water has not been used,
an intention of abandon may be inferred in the absence of proof of
some fact or condition excusing such non-use.
4. Where objection is not made to introduction in evidence of
water commissioner's reports because not sworn to, and admissibility
of such evidence is first questioned in Supreme Court, it is too late

to urge such objection.-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-CONTROL

OF SIDEWALKS-OBSTRUC-

et al. vs. The People-No. 13370
April 8, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.

TIONS-MANDAMUS-Wood

-Decided

1. A city of the second class is not authorized by either charter
or statute to pass an ordinance permitting the erection and maintenance
by private parties for private gain of gasoline pumps on the sidewalks of
the city which are obstructions to public travel.
2. Such city cannot authorize a permanent encroachment by
private individuals and the latter cannot successfully set up a claim of
right to encumber the public streets and walks.-Judgment affirmed.
DIVORCE -

PLEADING -

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Guilford vs.

Guilford-No. 13679-Decided April 1, 1935--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Campbell.
Where a plaintiff brought suit for divorce on the grounds of extreme and repeated acts of cruelty and asked for alimony and the case
is tried to the Court without a jury and the Court enters findings of
fact in favor of the plaintiff, even though the evidence is conflicting,
where there is sufficient evidence to justify such findings they will not

be disturbed on appeal.-Judgment affirmed.
TROVER-FRAUD AND DECEIT--STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ALLEG-

ING VALUE-Rogers vs. Rogers-No.

1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.

13577-Decided April 1,

1. The mere breach of a contract will not support an action in
trover.
2. Conversion means any distinct unauthorized act of dominion
or ownership assumed by one person over personal property belonging
to another.
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3. Where defendant as collateral security for a loan delivered a
note and mortgage to plaintiff, and thereafter secured possession of the
collateral upon a representation that he would temporarily use said
collateral for the purpose of another loan from a third party and would
return the collateral to plaintiff, and that instead of so using the collateral for such other loan caused the mortgage to be released and the
collateral to be destroyed, defendant was liable for conversion.
4. The plaintiff had such a qualified property interest in the note
and mortgage put up as collateral as to sustain an action in tort for
its conversion.
5. In an action for conversion of the note and mortgage it is
not necessary to set forth the value thereof as in conversion of a note
and mortgage, the face value is prima facie their value.--Judgment reversed.
ACCIDENT

INSURANCE -

OCCUPATION

-

GENERAL

MANAGER

ACCIDENT WITHIN TERMS OF POLICY-QUESTION OF FACT FOR

JURY-Rex vs. Continental Casualty Co.-No. 13348-Decided
April 1, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
1. Where an accident policy was issued to the deceased as a select
risk, and his duties described in the policy as General Manager of a
limestone company and his duties were described as "general manager,
office and traveling duties only" and he was killed by being run over
by a tram car while walking along a track at a limestone quarry,
whether or not such death was within the terms of the policy was a
question of fact which should be submitted to the jury.
2. Under such circumstances it was error for the Court below
to direct a verdict.
3. When the plaintiff established the death of insured to have
been accidental, she made out a prima facie case under the terms of
the policy and the burden was then upon the defendant if it would
avoid payment to show that the accident was within one of the exceptions named in the policy.
4. When the policy classified the deceased as general manager
of a limestone company with office and traveling duties it would be
assumed that he would do the things general managers of such congerns usually do, and this would include not only office work but traveling with a destination in view, and duties to be performed upon his
arrival, and it was a question of fact for the jury as to whether he was
performing such duties after his arrival at destination at the time of
his death.-Judgment reversed.
REPLEVIN-AUTOMOBILE-NECESSITY OF TRANSFER OF POSSESSION AS AGAINST CREDITORS-Danielvs. Surratt-No. 13642-

Decided April 1, 193 5 -Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
1. Section 5113 Compiled Laws of 1921 which provides in substance that if sale of chattels made by vendor, shall be presumed to be
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fraudulent and void a9 against creditors of vendor unless accompanied
by immediate delivery and change of possession, applies to the sale of
an automobile.
2. Where a husband transferred his automobile to his wife by
assignment of certificate of title at a time when he was indebted to
creditors, and after such assignment, the husband took out a license in
his own name and the car was continued to be kept in the same garage
at the home of the husband and wife at night and in a public garage
during the day time, and the husband continued to use the car, and the
wife's use of the car, both prior and subsequent to the assignment,
was only casual, there was no such immediate delivery followed by
actual and continued change of possession, as would take the transaction out of the statute.
3. There must be an actual delivery and actual and continued
change of possession in order to constitute a valid sale as against the
rights4.of creditors.
A joint or concurrent possession of both vendor and vendee
as is likely to occur between members of a household, particularly, husband and wife, as here, is not permissible where the interests of creditors
are involved.
5.
Even if it be proven that the sale was bona fide and no fraud
intended, the case is not taken from under the statute.
6. Only the Legislature can remove the harshness of the application of this statute to such facts as are present in the case at bar.Judgment reversed.
MISTAKE-RELEASE OF MORTGAGE-LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF RECHolt vs.
ORD PLEADING SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT Mitchell-No. 13644-Decided March 25, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Young.
1. Where holder of a first mortgage releases same and takes a
new mortgage without knowledge of liens that had attached to the land
subsequent to the recording of the first mortgage, relying on a statement of the county clerk and recorder that no liens existed, a complaint
alleging such facts states a cause of action for relief in having such
later mortgage to be declared to be a lien prior to a second mortgage,
where the other parties had not changed their status by reason thereof.
2.
The mistake and bona fides of it are the matters material in
the complaint and where third parties resist correction of such mistake,
the burden is on them to show damage resulting to them in reliance
on the act done by mistake.
3.
Equity, however, will refuse to rectify a mistake where it is
caused through inexcusable negligence of party who asks to be relieved
from mistake.
4.
It is not always necessary to secure an abstract of title and
have it examined before releasing a senior lien in order to state a' cause
of action for relief against mistake in releasing senior lien.--Judgment
reversed.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-COAL LEASE-INJUNCTION-DEMURRER
FOR WANT OF FACTS-EASEMENT-Clark vs. Louisville-Lafa-

yette Coal Co.-No. 13309-Decided April 1, 1935--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where plainff leased land to defendant for coal mining purposes and defendant owned leases on adjoining lands, which adjoining
lands it had been working, both surface and underground, through the
lands of the plaintiff and the lease by its terms, contemplated the mining of coal from adjacent properties and provided special compensation
therefor, only in case royalties in excess of 10c per ton be paid thereon,
the general consideration for the lease must be the consideration for
all coal so mined on royalties, of that amount or less, and plaintiff is
not entitled to an injunction to prevent the operation of the adjacent
mines through plaintiff's land.
2. Separate premises in a contract require no apportionment of
the consideration.
3. Where a lease discloses the intention of the parties that certain privileges should form an incident thereof such as the lease in
controversy discloses with respect to coal mined from adjacent premises
on royalties not exceeding 10c per ton, an easement may be acquired.
4. Such easement may be acquired irrespective of the form in
which such intention may be expressed.
5. The allegation that defendant has largely abandoned operations under its lease with plaintiff and is devoting its activities principally to the mining of coal on adjacent lands, contains no statement
of fact to support damages or fix the amount, particularly in view of
a provision of the lease that a fixed royalty of $100 per month must be
paid regardless of operations.
6. Where the lease provides in case of breach the remedy is forfeiture, but that thirty days' notice must be given, with opportunity
to remedy, before action may be maintained, such notice must be given.
-- Judgment affirmed.
WATERS--INTERPRETATION -

DECREE -

SEEPAGE AND EVAPORA-

TION-Riverside Reservoir and Land Co. vs. Hinderlider-No.

13358-Decided April 1, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. A decree adjudicating priorities provided that there be allowed
to flow into the reservoir of plaintiff from the South Platte River, under
certain priorities, to be diverted through its inlet, a certain number of
cubic feet of water annually, and by virtue of another priority a certain number of cubic feet annually to be also diverted through its inlet.
2. Under such a decree the plaintiff is only entitled to senior
priorities for the specific number of cubic feet to be diverted from the
South Platte River through the inlet of its reservoir, and it is not entitled
to add thereto an additional quantity of water sufficient to make up
for such seepage as might occur while its reservoir is filling or for the
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evaporation going on from the surface of the reservoir after the water
has been taken from the stream.
3. The decree is clear, complete and unambiguous. It calls for
diversion of specified quantities of water from the river. The amount
so diverted can be measured by recognized methods and the State Engineer in construing such decree was correct in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to divert an additional amount of water equivalent
to the losses suffered by seepage and evaporation.-Judgment affirmed.

AGENCY-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE-Merrow
vs. Silversmith-No. 13429-DecidedMarch 25, 1935--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
1. Where an agent is authorized to sell stock for a corporation,
such authority does not include authority to pledge stock or borrow
money.
2. Where party dealing with an agent has full opportunity to
make inquiry as to agent's authority, and does not do so, he deals with
agent at his peril.
3. Where facts are in dispute as to what oral contract was made
with agent, trial court's findings will not be disturbed.--Judgment
affirmed.
HIGHWAYS-PRIVATE ROADS-RIGHT OF COUNTY TO INTERVENELeach vs. Manhart-No. 13560-Decided March 25, 1935Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. In an action for injunction between private parties to enjoin
the obstruction of an alleged public road, the County through its Board
of Commissioners have a right to intervene.
2. Interference with the use of a public highway may be enjoined by a board of county commissioners.
3. The Court below erred in denying right of county to intervene.--Judgment reversed.
MERGER-International Trust Co. vs. Rodewald-No. 13200-Decided March 18, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Mergers are presumed when equity demands, otherwise, not.
Where Rodewald gave a first and second mortgage on real estate and the
holder foreclosed on the second and bid the property in for more than
its value the holder of the first mortgage can sue the maker on the note
and is entitled to judgment. In such case there is no merger.
2. The right to waive the security and sue on the note, even
when the security has substance, is well established.--Judgrent reversed.

